Abstract. Enterprise applications can be structured as domains, where each domain contains objects that are replicated for fault tolerance, with the replication being managed by a fault tolerance infrastructure local to the domain. Gateways can allow unreplicated clients to bene t from the fault tolerance services of the replicated servers, without compromising replica consistency within the fault tolerance domain. For CORBA-based enterprise applications, the gateway m e c hanisms can be implemented transparently to the ORB and to the application using interception speci c enhancements to existing ORBs make it possible for unreplicated clients to enjoy a higher degree of reliability.
Introduction
Applications are increasingly spanning enterprises across the Internet, with the application objects within one enterprise comm unicating with, and performing operations on, the application objects of another enterprise. The reliability of the application as a whole depends on the reliability of the objects in each of the comm unicating enterprises, which are separated possibly by a considerable distance, as shown in Fig 1 . Each e n terprise is likely to be, and indeed should be, responsible only for the reliability of the objects under its control, but each e n terprise m ust nevertheless allow the objects of a di erent enterprise to comm unicate with its own objects without compromising the consistency of the replicated objects of either enterprise. The domain of con trol of the fault tolerance infrastructure of each e n terprise constitutes a fault tolerance domain di erent fault tolerance domains can be connected through a gateway. The concepts of fault tolerance domains and gateways are not restricted to communication between enterprises. Internet-based applications such a s s t o c k trading involve customers using Web browsers (typically unreplicated thin clients) to communicate with the servers (typically replicated for fault tolerance) of a stock trading company. The unreplicated Web browser should not need to be aware of the replication of the stock trading servers, but can nevertheless benet from the fault tolerance of the servers. The unreplicated clients (the Web browsers) can be made to communicate with the replicated servers (the stock trading servers) through a gateway that hides the replication of the servers. The replicated servers are managed by t h e fault tolerance infrastructure of the stock trading company, and the gateway serves as the \entry point" into the fault tolerance domain. The gateway is a crucial element because it must \understand" the reliability mechanisms inside the fault tolerance domain, as well as the unreliable semantics of the external client, and must bridge these di erent semantics and mechanisms, without compromising the reliability of the objects within the fault tolerance domain.
A di erent motivation for a fault tolerance domain is that an application might h a ve a large number of objects that require replication, and it might not be a scalable or feasible solution for a single fault tolerance infrastructure to manage the replication of all of these objects. Instead, it would be preferable to decompose the application into smaller collections of objects, with each collection of applications running over commercial-o -the-shelf implementations of CORBA. The mechanisms implemented in di erent parts of the Eternal system work together e ciently to provide strong replica consistency with low o verheads, and without requiring modi cation of either the application or the ORB.
In the Eternal system, the client and server objects of the CORBA application are replicated, and the replicas are distributed across the system. Active replication and passive replication of both client and server objects are supported. To facilitate replica consistency, the Eternal system conveys the Internet Inter-ORB Protocol (IIOP) messages of the CORBA application using an underlying reliable totally ordered multicast group communication system, such a s T otem 4].
The structure of the Eternal system is shown in Figure 2 . The Eternal Replication Manager replicates each application object, according to user-speci ed fault tolerance properties (including the choice of replication style { stateless, cold passive, warm passive, active, active with voting) and distributes the replicas across the system. The Eternal Resource Manager monitors the system resources, and maintains the initial and minimum number of replicas.
The Eternal Interceptor captures the IIOP messages (containing the client's requests and the server's replies), which are intended for TCP/IP, and diverts them instead to the Eternal Replication Mechanisms for multicasting via Totem. The Eternal Replication Mechanisms, along with the Eternal Logging-Recovery Mechanisms, maintain the consistency of the replicas, detect and provide recovery from faults. The Replication Mechanisms and the Totem protocols run on every processor within a fault tolerance domain.
The Eternal Evolution Manager exploits object replication to support upgrades to the CORBA application objects. The Replication Manager, the Resource Manager and the Evolution Manager are themselves implemented as collections of CORBA objects and, thus, can themselves be replicated and thereby bene t from Eternal's fault tolerance capabilities. They need not be present o n e v ery processor their replicas can run on any processor within the fault tolerance domain.
The technology of Eternal formed the basis of our response 2] to the Object Management Group's Request for Proposals 8] on fault-tolerant CORBA. With our close involvement in the ongoing OMG standardization process, it appears likely that the technology of Eternal will form the basis of the forthcoming OMG standard for fault tolerance for CORBA.
Transparency via Interception
The Eternal Interceptor 7] is a non-ORB-level, non-application-level component that transparently \attaches" itself to every executing CORBA object, without the object's or the ORB's knowledge, and is capable of modifying the object's behavior as desired. Because of its location underneath the ORB, Eternal's Interceptor is transparent to the ORB and to the application, and can be implemented i n a n ORB-independent manner. Current operating systems provide \hooks", such as library interpositioning, that can be exploited to develop interceptors. Using library interpositioning, the Eternal Interceptor can transparently override the default de nitions for the symbols in any dynamically linked library, without requiring modi cation of the ORB, the CORBA application or the operating system.
The library routines that an interceptor is made to rede ne in a library-interpositioning implementation, depends on the extent o f the information that the interceptor must extract (from the ORB or the CORBA application) to enhance the application with new features. The interceptor may capture all, or a particular subset, of the library routines used by the CORBA application, depending on the feature being added. The library interpositioning approach u s e d by Eternal's Interceptor has no overheads in the path of message transmission, and can be deployed with various ORBs.
Strong Replica Consistency
The Replication Mechanisms, operating in concert with the LoggingRecovery Mechanisms, provide for strongly consistent replication of the CORBA application objects. Eternal provides support for the detection and suppression of duplicate invocations and duplicate responses, and for state transfer to new and recovering replicas for both actively and passively replicated objects. Most commercial applications and/or ORBs use multithreading, a signi cant source of non-determinism. T o ensure strong replica consistency even for multithreaded CORBA objects that are replicated, Eternal employs special Interceptor-level mechanisms to enforce determinism for multithreaded CORBA applications, without requiring them to be modied. While the fault tolerance infrastructure ensures strong replica consistency within the fault tolerance domain, it is the responsibility of the gateway to ensure that unreplicated clients wishing to contact replicated objects within the fault tolerance domain (through the gateway) do not compromise the replica consistency of those replicated objects.
Gateways to Fault Tolerance Domains
Eternal must allow the CORBA applications that it supports to communicate with unreplicated objects that are outside the fault tolerance domain, i.e., Eternal's domain of cont r o l . S o m e o f t h e s e unreplicated objects (e.g., a W eb browser on a personal computer that provides no fault tolerance) may not be supported by, o r h a ve access to, Eternal's fault tolerance infrastructure, and may run over standard IIOP-enabled ORBs.
Eternal ensures that these unreplicated objects outside the fault tolerance domain can nevertheless communicate with the replicated objects that are under Eternal's control inside the fault tolerance domain. Eternal makes this communication possible without the unreplicated object ever being aware of the existence of a fault tolerance domain, of the replication of the objects within the fault tolerance domain, or of Eternal itself. Thus, Eternal extends the replication transparency that it provides to the application objects within the fault tolerance domain equally to unreplicated objects outside Eternal's control.
The gateways that the Eternal system provides serve as the \en-try point" for unreplicated clients into the fault tolerance domain, and allow unreplicated external objects to invoke replicated Eternalmanaged objects.
Within a fault tolerance domain:
{ All objects are replicated, with the replication managed by Eternal's fault tolerance infrastructure. Each replicated object is assigned a unique object group identi er.
{ Communication between replicated objects occurs through a reliable totally-ordered multicast protocol, thereby facilitating replica consistency, as described in Section 2.2. The Replication Mechanisms hosting the replicas of an object are addressed by m ulticasting messages to the object's group identi er.
{ Replicated clients do not use the TCP/IP fhost, portg information within the Interoperable Object Reference (IOR) of any of the server replicas to contact the replicated server. Instead, the Eternal Interceptor transparently diverts the socket establishment routines at every client replica to form a connection to the local Eternal Replication Mechanisms, which t h e n m ulticast the noti cation of the connection establishment to the Replication Mechanisms hosting the server replicas. Outside a fault tolerance domain: { Clients use the TCP/IP fhost, portg information within the Interoperable Object Reference (IOR) of the target server to establish a connection with the server. Unreplicated objects outside the fault tolerance domain must never be allowed to access the replicated objects within the fault tolerance domain directly. S u c h direct communication, if permitted, would violate replica consistency. The reason is that the unreplicated client can communicate only through TCP/IP, thereby implying that it would contact only one of the server replicas, and invoke a n o p e ration on that replica alone.
If the server is actively replicated, and only the single invoked server replica performs the operation, it may h a ve a di erent state from that of the other replicas of the server object, resulting in inconsistent replication. If the server is passively replicated, and the single primary replica is invoked, the primary replica might itself invoke nested operations as a result of the original invocation. If the primary fails before it receives the results of the nested invocations, a new primary server replica will be elected. However, because the new primary (formerly a backup replica) did not receive the original invocation, it will not be able to handle the returned responses from the nested invocations and to return a response to the original invocation. Thus, to ensure replica consistency, the replicas of an object are contacted through a reliable totally-ordered multicast, and not individually through TCP/IP. Additional mechanisms are provided by Eternal so that an IOR published by a replicated object within the fault tolerance domain \point" the external clients in the direction of the IIOP-enabled gateway, rather than the target replicated object. However, the external client that uses this IOR is unaware of this. When using the information in the IOR for connection establishment, the client implicitly assumes that the endpoint is the real server and, thus, sends IIOP invocations (destined for the server) to the gateway.
Note that the gateway is not a CORBA object, but constitutes part of the mechanisms p r o vided by the fault tolerance infrastructure of Eternal. However, by receiving the unreplicated client's IIOP in-vocations without returning exceptions, and by forwarding the replicated server's IIOP responses to the unreplicated clients, the gateway appears to the client to be a remote CORBA server object.
To perform the invocation (response) forwarding into (out of) the fault tolerance domain, the gateway m ust be able to interpret the IIOP messages sent o ver TCP/IP connections from outside the fault tolerance domain, as well as the reliable totally-ordered multicast protocol messages within the fault tolerance domain, and must provide the necessary translation between them. This functionality o f the gateway is shown in Figure 3 .
Another aspect of the gateway i s t h a t i t m ust \hide" the replication of the servers from the external client. This involves detecting duplicate responses returned by the replicas of the server, and ltering out only a single distinct response to the external client. In addition, the gateway m ust itself be reliable so that it does not constitute a single point of failure.
Connection Establishment
When a gateway is used, every unreplicated external client m ust continue to \believe" that the remote endpoint t o w h i c h it connects (using the information in the server IOR) is the server when, in fact, the remote endpoint is the gateway. This can be done by ensuring that the addressing information in the IOR is the fgateway host, gateway portg and that the gateway a l w ays returns the expected IIOP responses to the client's IIOP invocations so that the client never suspects otherwise.
Eternal replaces the fserver host, server portg in the IOR of each server replica with the fgateway host, gateway portg through the u s e o f i t s I n terceptor. The intent o f t h e I n terceptor is to interpose at the point that the server-side ORB queries the operating system for the host and the port information, prior to publishing the IOR. By modifying the getsockname() call and/or the sysinfo() call (with the SI HOSTNAME command) to return the gateway host and the gateway port instead of the server host and the server port, respectively, the IOR that the server-side ORB publishes automatically contains the fgateway host, gateway portg. This eliminates the e ort of having to parse the IOR string to do the replacement, and also results in fewer undesirable interceptions. The gateway host and the gateway port are dedicated choices that are supplied to the interceptor at system con guration time.
TCP
When an unreplicated client uses this IOR, the client-side ORB, implicitly assuming that the host and port in the IOR refer to the server object, connects the client to the gateway. The gateway n o w becomes the recipient o f e v ery IIOP message sent b y the unreplicated client, which continues to \believe" that the gateway is indeed the target server object. By extracting the server's object key (which t h e client-side ORB inserts into IIOP invocations to identify the target server), the gateway identi es the target server, multicasts the client invocation to the server object group. The gateway inserts su cient information into the multicast messages to enable it to associate the server's response with the client's invocation.
The gateway process must be continuously listening for connections from unreplicated clients on its dedicated fgateway host, gateway portg. F or each new client that contacts the gateway, the gateway s p a wns a new TCP/IP socket to communicate solely with that client, and uses the original socket to listen for further clients. The additional spawned sockets are destroyed when the connection between the unreplicated client and the gateway terminates.
Note that the replacement of the fserver host, server portg in the IOR does not a ect connection establishment or communication within the fault tolerance domain. Replicated clients wishing to communicate with replicated servers within the fault tolerance domain never use this TCP/IP-speci c addressing information, but use instead the server's object group identi er to contact the replicated server through the fault tolerance infrastructure.
Encapsulation of IIOP into Multicast Messages
A gateway m ust encapsulate the IIOP invocations from the external unreplicated clients into multicast messages for transmission to the target replicated server object within the fault tolerance domain. Similarly, the IIOP responses, encapsulated within the multicast messages returned by the replicated server object, must be extracted by the gateway and returned to the unreplicated clients.
When an IIOP-encapsulating message is multicast by the gateway i n to the fault tolerance domain, the message contains the gateway group id as the sender group, and the server group id (determined by the gateway from the server's object key embedded in the client's IIOP invocation) as the destination group. The message is received in total order by the Replication Mechanisms hosting each o f the server replicas. The replicated server performs the operation, and the fault tolerance infrastructure multicasts the results to the gateway. The replicated server assumes that the gateway that sent t h e IIOP invocation is a CORBA client object. Eternal's transparency through interception e ectively ensures that neither the unreplicated client, nor any of the server replicas, is ever aware of communicating through the fault tolerance infrastructure using reliable multicast. The gateway (and, of course, the fault tolerance infrastructure itself) is the only party i n t h e c hain of communication that is aware of the reliable multicast and the fault tolerance infrastructure.
When the replicated server returns the response to the gateway, the IIOP response from each server replica is encapsulated by t h e Replication Mechanisms hosting that replica into a multicast message. The message contains the server group id as the sender group, and the gateway group id as the destination group. This information is insu cient for the gateway to route the IIOP response to the client replica that invoked the operation because multiple unreplicated TCP/IP-based clients may h a ve i n voked the same replicated server through the gateway. The gateway has no way of discriminating between these clients.
Thus, every multicast message must contain additional information, inserted by the gateway to identify each TCP/IP client t h a t contacts the gateway. The resulting multicast messages have t h e structure shown in Figure 4 . For every multicast message exchanged between replicated objects within the fault tolerance domain, the TCP/IP client i d e n ti cation is set to some unused value. The gateway (as well as the fault tolerance infrastructure) uses the destination group identi er, the source group identi er and the TCP/IP client i d e n ti er collectively to route every message to its intended destination.
Ideally, the client i d e n ti cation information ought to be supplied by the client-side ORB, as discussed in Section 3.5. Because this is not the case with current ORBs, the gateway maintains a simple counter, one for each destination server group. For each i n c o ming TCP/IP client, the gateway rst determines the server group id from the rst IIOP message received from the client. The gateway then uses the value of the counter corresponding to that server group as the TCP/IP client i d e n ti er. The counter is then incremented, to serve as the identi er for the next TCP/IP client for the same replicated server. The disadvantage of the gateway-assigned client i d e nti ers, over identi ers supplied by the client-side ORB, is discussed in Section 3.4. Figure 5 shows the sequence of steps that the gateway executes for incoming IIOP messages from outside the fault tolerance domain, and incoming multicast messages from within the fault tolerance domain.
Duplicate Detection and Suppression
To ensure replica consistency, duplicate detection and suppression mechanisms are used by Eternal throughout the fault tolerance domain the gateways also employ these mechanisms for ltering du- plicate responses from the replicated server objects within the fault tolerance domain. The gateway returns only a distinct copy o f e a c h response to the invoking external client. The duplicate copies of each response, if not suppressed, would be delivered to the client o b j e c t , and may cause the client object's state to be corrupted. To detect duplicate copies of each response, both the fault tolerance infrastructure and the gateway prepend an operation identi er to each message that is multicast within the fault tolerance domain, as shown in Figure 4 . The operation identi er takes the form of either an invocation identi er for all multicast messages that encapsulate IIOP invocations, or a response identi er for all messages that encapsulate IIOP responses.
Operation Identi ers For each outgoing IIOP invocation received by the gateway from an unreplicated client, the gateway generates the invocation identi er as shown in Figure 6 . The gateway then inserts the invocation identi er into the Eternal-speci c header of the message that it multicasts into the fault tolerance domain. The timestamp of this multicast message, which forms a part of the in- vocation identi er, is lled in by the fault tolerance infrastructure at the receiving end, when the message is delivered. The timestamp information is derived from the totally-ordered message sequence numbers assigned by the multicast group communication system. For each outgoing IIOP response sent b y a server replica, Eternal \remembers" and reuses a portion of the invocation identi er that was sent with the corresponding invocation. The portion of the invocation identi er that is reused in its counterpart response identi er is the operation identi er, w h i c h completely and uniquely identi es the operation consisting of the invocation-response pair. Both the invocation and the response identi ers have the same operation identi er elds. Furthermore, the operation identi er is identically determined at every server replica.
The gateway, on receipt of multiple copies (one copy for each server replica that returns a response) of a response to an IIOP invocation that it multicasts into the domain, can deliver the rst copy t h a t i t r e c e i v es, and discard all subsequently received copies by simply comparing the response identi er elds of the Eternal-speci c header.
An invocation identi er has the form (T B inv (T A inv S A inv )), where T A inv is the timestamp of the message containing the invocation of group A, T B inv is the timestamp of the message containing the invocation of the group B, a n d S A inv is the sequence number of the invocation of B in the sequence of invocations by group A. Similarly, a response identi er has the form (T Bres (T A inv S A inv )), where T Bres is the timestamp of the message containing the response by group B to group A and the other two elds are the same as for the invocation identi er. These invocation and response identi ers are contained in the multicast messages.
Note that the timestamps T A inv , T B inv and T Bres are derived from the totally-ordered message sequence numbers assigned by t h e T otem multicast group communication system. The system-wide uniqueness of these timestamps (as a result of the total ordering) contributes to the uniqueness of the operation identi ers, and thus, to the detection of duplicate messages.
In the example of Figure 6 , T A inv corresponds to 100, S A inv corresponds to 3, T B inv corresponds to 120 and T Bres corresponds to 171. In the case of the gateway, A represents the gateway group and B represents the target replicated server that the unreplicated client (that connects to the gateway) wishes to contact.
Using Existing ORBs
Existing ORBs do not have the capability to traverse a list of proles, and select the next pro le if the rst one fails on connection.
The disadvantage of this is that redundant gateways are not possible. Clients may experience disconnection if the processor hosting the gateway fails, and does not recover. The processor hosting the gateway is a single point of failure. If the client ORB has the capability to understand only the rst IIOP pro le (the standard TAG INTERNET IOP pro le), and if the gateway to which it connects using the rst pro le fails, the client has no alternative b u t to abandon the request. Furthermore, the client does not know t h e status of any i n vocations that it has already sent, for which i t i s s t i l l awaiting responses. An alternative to using multiple gateways might b e t o h a ve a cold passively replicated gateway. In this case, the gateway's state should be checkpointed often enough to allow i t t o b e r e c o vered. However, clients will still be disconnected from the gateway if it fails, and must have mechanisms to allow them to reconnect to the gateway, when it recovers.
In the case of redundant g a t e w ays, the new gateway t o w h i c h the client connects (on failure of the rst gateway) has no way o f \knowing" that this is the same client. The simple counter mechanism, described in Section 3.2, is insu cient in this case to identify the client. This means that, even if the new gateway receives the response for an outstanding invocation sent b y the client through the rst gateway, the new gateway does not know which of its connected clients should receive this response. Secondly, if the client w ere now to re-issue all of the pending invocations to the new gateway, t h e new gateway m a y, in turn, re-issue these invocations to the replicated objects within the fault tolerance domain, thereby corrupting their state.
Thus, due to lack o f c l i e n t-side identi cation provided by t h e ORB, the gateway cannot prevent duplication of client requests if { The unreplicated client fails, recovers and resends its request (this is outside the fault tolerance domain's and the gateway's control, and cannot be handled without extending some of the fault tolerance mechanisms to the unreplicated client) { The gateway process fails, and then recovers, and the client reconnects to the gateway { Redundant g a t e w ays are used, and the original gateway fails, and the client switches to the next operational gateway 3.5 Enhancements to Existing ORBs If only a single gateway i s p r o vided for a fault tolerance domain, it is insu cient to guarantee the level of reliability that customers of Internet-based applications have come to expect. For instance, if a customer uses an unreplicated Web browser to connect to a replicated stock trading server through a gateway, the failure of the gateway could leave the customer wondering about the status of any outstanding invocations issued on the stock trading server. Because the gateway constitutes a single point of failure, the bene ts of the server replication are lost to the customer.
The use of redundant gateways requires additional intelligence on the part of the client-side ORB to exploit the multiple gateways.
Unfortunately, the required mechanisms are not part of the current CORBA standard. In the absence of the required support in current ORBs, we h a ve implemented a thin client-side interception layer that mimics the support that an enhanced client-side ORB would provide to allow unreplicated CORBA clients to bene t from fault tolerance. As discussed in Section 3.5, we e n visage that the functionality o f t h i s interception layer will eventually incorporated into the client-side ORB itself.
According to the current CORBA standard, a pro le contains addressing information within an IOR. An object's IOR can contain multiple pro les, with each pro le designating an alternative address for contacting the object. To a l l o w the addressing information for the multiple gateways to be made available to unreplicated clients, the Eternal Interceptor \stitches"' together the addressing information for each gateway i n to a single multi-pro le IOR.
On the client side, the thin interception layer has the capability of traversing the pro les within the multi-pro le IOR, should this be required. The interception layer connects the client object to the rst gateway listed in the multi-pro le IOR, and inserts a unique TCP/IP client identi er into the service context eld (a part of the IIOP request and reply messages), where the user may insert information if a receiving ORB cannot interpret this information, it will ignore it) of each IIOP message sent out by the client. The advantage of using the service context eld is that it can be safely ignored (as is the case here) by a server ORB that does not understand it. It is intended purely for the consumption of the gateway.
For each IIOP request message that a gateway receives from a client, the gateway rst multicasts the message to the group of gateways. This is done so that every gateway in the group has a record of the invocation in case the rst connected gateway fails. The gateway group then multicasts the message into the fault tolerance domain, and the gateway group (and not the connected gateway alone) receives the response.
If the rst gateway fails to respond, the client-side interception layer transparently skips to the next pro le in the multi-pro le IOR, and connects the client to the next operational gateway, and reissues any pending invocations. If the client object sent a n i n vocation for which a response was expected from the rst gateway, the client-side interception layer obtains it from the next operational gateway. T h i s is possible because the client-side interception layer supplies the same unique client i d e n ti er for each of its requests, along with a unique request identi er, which w ould make it possible for the new gateway to detect reinvocations due to reconnection of the client-side interception layer to a di erent gateway. The reason for the reinvocations is two-fold: rstly, it allows the client-side interception layer to communicate the client's unique identi er to the gateway, and secondly, the client-side interception layer has no way o f k n o wing if the rst invocation ever reached the original failed gateway. Each gateway also contains the intelligence to inform all of the other gateways in the event that the client fails. In this case, the gateways can delete any state that they may h a ve stored on behalf of the client.
Eternal's duplicate detection and suppression mechanisms d escribed in Section 3.3, along with the unique client i d e n ti er, and CORBA's existing request identi er mechanisms, enable the gateway to preserve the replica consistency within the fault tolerance domain, as well as to protect the unreplicated client outside the fault tolerance domain from having its state corrupted. Furthermore, the redundant g a t e w ays scheme enables the unreplicated client to bene t from the fault tolerance of the server.
Related Work
Other systems have addressed issues related to consistent object replication and fault tolerance for CORBA applications. The Object Group Service 3] provides replication for CORBA applications through a set of CORBA services. Replica consistency is ensured through group communication based on a consensus algorithm implemented through CORBA service objects. Mechanisms have b e e n provided for duplicate detection and suppression, and for state transfer of application state.
The Maestro toolkit 12] includes an IIOP-conformant ORB with an open architecture that supports multiple execution styles and request processing policies. The replicated updates execution style can be used to add reliability and high availability properties to client/server CORBA applications in settings where it is not feasible to make modi cations at the client side, as in the case of unreplicated clients contacting replicated server objects. The Maestro toolkit addresses some of the issues in the implementation of gateways.
The AQuA architecture 1, 10] is a CORBA-based dependability framework that provides object replication and fault tolerance. AQuA exploits the group communication facilities and the ordering guarantees of the underlying Ensemble and Maestro toolkits to ensure replica consistency for the application. The AQuA gateway translates CORBA object invocations into messages that are transmitted via Ensemble. Duplicate invocations and duplicate responses are detected and ltered by the gateway.
The Distributed Object-Oriented Reliable Service (DOORS) 11] provides fault tolerance through a CORBA-compliant service approach. DOORS consists of CORBA objects that detect, and recover from, replica and processor faults. The system provides support for management of resource and reliability requirements based on the needs of the CORBA application. DOORS employs libraries for the transparent c heckpointing of applications however, duplicate detection and suppression are not addressed.
Conclusion
The Eternal system allows applications to span multiple enterprises over the Internet, with the application being decomposed into fault tolerance domains, with the mechanisms of Eternal providing strong replica consistency within each fault tolerance domain. In addition, Eternal provides gateways to allow unreplicated clients and other fault tolerance domains to communicate with the replicated server objects within a fault tolerance domain, without compromising the replica consistency within any fault tolerance domain. Through the use of interception, Eternal provides this fault tolerance transparently to the CORBA application and to the ORB. The gateway mechanisms are crucial to today's applications, where clients are unreplicated, but nevertheless wish to bene t from the fault tolerance provided for the servers.
